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Abstract. Many virtual payment systems are available on the world
wide web for micropayment, and as they deal with money, correctness
is important. One such payment system is Netpay. This paper examines
the server-side version of the Netpay protocol and provides its formal-
ization as a CSP model. The PAT model checker is used to prove three
properties essential for correctness: impossibility of double spending, va-
lidity of an ecoin during the execution and the absence of deadlock. We
prove that the protocol is executing according to its description based on
the assumption that the customers and vendors are cooperative. This is
a very strong assumption for system built to prevent abuse, but further
analysis suggests that without it the protocol does no longer guarantee
all correctness properties.
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1 Introduction
The Internet has grown into a virtual market where the exchange of a wide range
of goods is everyday practice. For many payments users have to use their credit
cards, even though the transaction costs are signiﬁcant for small transactions.
To facilitate payment of smaller amounts micro-payment technologies emerged
[7]. With the increase of paid services and content on the Internet, these online
payment system promise the ease of using cash. There are many micro-payment
systems available for users to buy goods online such as Netpay [7], Millicent
[8], Micro-mint [12], Payword [12], MiniPay [10], Micro-iKP [9] and POPCORN
[11]. There are also many micro-payment systems proposed for content sharing
in peer to peer networks [1] [2], [14], [15] and [16].
Every payment protocol should guarantee certain essential properties of cor-
rectness. In this paper we will model one such system, Netpay, formally, and
show that it satisﬁes essential properties. This paper considers a variant called
server-side Netpay in which the e-coins are kept by trusted brokers and vendors,
while the customer will only have access to the e-coin ID. This is in contrast
to the so-called client-side Netpay protocol in which e-coins are kept by the
customers. Previous work considered the correctness of client-side Netpay [3].
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This paper models the server-side Netpay using CSP [13]. The model in this
paper covers the handling of e-coins, and omits the parts of the protocol that
are concerned with redeeming e-coins, and digital signatures of e-coins. It is
assumed that the correctness of these are guaranteed independently, especially
the correctness of the used cryptographic hash functions. Instead, we prove that
the protocol can guarantee that a trusted broker will correctly track an e-coin,
even though it will be passed from vendor to vendor, that at any time only one
vendor will have a copy of the e-coin, that the customer can not spend more than
the e-coin is worth. Finally, we considered whether the system was deadlock free
and discovered that some arguably strong assumptions are necessary to ensure
correctness. If customers do not cooperate they can get the system into a state
where deadlock is possible. We also analysed a design alternative that does not
have this problem.
Section 2 introduces the server-side Netpay protocol. Section 3 shows the
description of the Netpay protocol using the CSP language. Correctness of this
protocol is discussed in Section 4. This paper concludes with discussion for future
research in section 5.
2 The Netpay Protocol
The Netpay protocol with server-side e-wallet was proposed by Dai et.al. [5]. It
has three types of e-wallets: client side, server-side and cookie-based e-wallet [6].
There are three parties involved in this protocol; customer, vendor and broker.
It is assumed that the broker and vendors are honest and are trusted by the cus-
tomers who may not be honest. To use the protocol, the customers and vendors
need to register by opening an account and depositing funds with the broker.
The broker is responsible for registration, e-coin generation, debiting and cred-
iting accounts for customers and vendors respectively. The payment is between
customers and vendors. Previous work has modeled and veriﬁed some properties
of client-side Netpay [3]
Netpay uses a number of cryptography and micro-payment terminologies such
as:
– One-way Hash Function: Netpay uses this function to generate and verify
e-coins. In [6] MD5 was used, but it could be replaced by more secure SHA-1.
– E-coin: The one-way hash function is applied repeatedly to a seed to gen-
erate a series of paywords called e-coin. The paywords are represented in
reverse order with the seed at the end. The length of the e-coin determines
its value.
– E-wallet: An e-wallet is a database to store e-coins.
– Seed: It is a randomly selected value used for e-coin generation.
– Touchstone: This is the ﬁrst payword of the e-coin. It is used to verify
e-coins.
Using the one way hash function h, an e-coin W1, ...,Wn is constructed by
applying the hash function n + 1 times to a seed i.e. W0 = h(W1),W1 =
h(W2), ...,Wn = h(Wn+1) where Wn+1 is the seed, and W0 the touchstone.
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The remainder of this section will describe the four basic types of transactions
in this protocol. It is assumed that each customer and vendor have a unique ID.
Customer-Broker Transaction. The customer sends an e-coin request with
parameter n to the broker, who generates e-coins of length n. Each chain
has a unique e-coin ID. The broker stores this information in its database,
and sends the e-coin ID to the customer.
Customer-Vendor Transaction. If a customer wishes to buy something from
the vendor, the customer sends an e-coin ID. The vendor checks if it has
the e-coin and veriﬁes it. If the veriﬁcation is successful, the customer is
notiﬁed. If the vendor does not have the e-coin, it requests the location from
the broker. The broker will reply with the location of the e-coin, the vendor
requests this e-coin from that vendor or broker. Initially, the broker will have
the e-coin and after that it will be transferred from one vendor to another.
Vendor-Vendor Transaction. This transaction occurs when one vendor re-
quests an e-coin from another vendor.
Vendor-Broker Transaction. Vendors need to redeem the e-coins spent by
customers. The vendor sends the e-coin IDs, touchstones, customer IDs, ven-
dor ID, e-coins and amount to the broker. The broker will verify e-coins and
credit the corresponding amount to the vendors account if the spent e-coins
are valid. This paper focuses on the spending of e-coins, and omits redemp-
tion of e-coins from the model.
Properties of the Netpay Protocol. This paper considers three important prop-
erties. The ﬁrst is on the validity of e-coins. Since there will be transfer of an
e-coin from one vendor to another, an e-coin should remain valid in this chain of
transfer. The second is on preventing double spending. This protocol prohibits
a customer to double spend an e-coin at a diﬀerent or same vendor. The last
property is to show absence of deadlocks.
3 Description of Netpay Protocol Using CSP
This section provides models and description for the Server-Side Netpay proto-
col. The three parties of the protocol: customer, vendor and broker have been
modeled as one process each. For simplicity we assume that there is only one
broker, while there can be many customers and vendors.
3.1 Customer Process
Table 1 shows the Customer(Cid) process for the customer Cid. This process
has three possible statuses: Idle, BuyCoin or Spending. Variable status c
keeps track of the status of a customer.
The customer database is stored in variable db c. It contains e-coin ID’s and
amounts. Recall, that an e-coin is constructed by applying hash function to a
seed. Each payword in Netpay is accompanied by an index to record number of
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Table 1. Customer Process
Customer(CID) =
[STATUS_C[CID] == IDLE && (||y:{0..(MAXCOINS-1)}@(DB_C[CID][y][0] == -1))]
BuyCoin!CID
5 {STATUS_C[CID] = BUYCOIN;} ->Customer(CID)
[][STATUS_C[CID] == BUYCOIN ]
SellCoin[CID]?id
{
var index = 0;
10 while(index < MAXCOINS)
{
if (DB_C[CID][index][0] == -1)
{
DB_C[CID][index][0] = id ;
15 DB_C[CID][index][1] = ISPOSITIVE;
index = MAXCOINS;//break the loop
}
index = index + 1;
}
20
STATUS_C[CID] = IDLE} -> Customer(CID)
[]([]x:{0..(VENDORS-1)};y:{0..(MAXCOINS-1)}@([STATUS_C[CID] == IDLE
&& DB_C[CID][y][0] != -1 ]
Spend[x]!CID.DB_C[CID][y][0].DB_C[CID][y][1]
25 {STATUS_C[CID] = SPENDING;} ->Customer(CID)))
[][STATUS_C[CID] == SPENDING]
Approval[CID]?eid1.amt
{
if (amt == ISZERO)
30 {
var index = 0;
while(index < MAXCOINS)
{
if(DB_C[CID][index][0]==eid1)
35 {
DB_C[CID][index][0] = -1;
DB_C[CID][index][1] = -1;
}
index = index + 1;
40 }
}
STATUS_C[CID] = IDLE;} ->Customer(CID)
[][STATUS_C[CID] == SPENDING]
Disapproval[CID]?vid
45 {STATUS_C[CID] = IDLE;} ->Customer(CID)
unspent paywords; the amount. The amount will be abstracted in this paper as
either IsPositive or IsZero. This is because the properties shown in this paper
are independent of hash function and the exact amount.
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Initially, the customer will have no e-coin ID stored in db c. The only enabled
event is to buy e-coins on the BuyCoin channel with parameter cid, which
is the customer ID. Events that use the BuyCoin channel have precondition
status c[Cid] == Idle i.e. the customer should be Idle in order to send a
message on this channel. After sending the message to the broker, the customer
will change to theBuyCoin state. The broker can reply on the SellCoin channel,
since the condition status c[Cid] == BuyCoin for the customer is met. The
customer adds the e-coin ID and the amount to db c, and changes to Idle.
If customer has e-coins and is in the Idle state, it can buy goods from a vendor
on channel Spend, which will synchronize with one of the vendors. The channel
has two parameters: e-coin ID and amount. After this event, the customer will
change the state to Spending. The vendor will reply on channel Approval or
Disapproval, depending on whether the payment was accepted or not. In either
case, the customer’s state will change to Idle.
There is not much processing done by the customer side compared to the
Client-Side Netpay protocol [3]. Most processing is done by the vendor. Note,
that the customer can try spending an e-coin as often as it wants. It is up to the
vendors and brokers to prevent double spending.
3.2 Broker Process
The process Broker(Bid) in Table 2 and Table 3 models the broker with unique
broker ID Bid. The broker has a database db b to store all generated e-coins. In
addition it has a database lookup that maps an e-coin ID to a vendor or broker.
The broker can have status Idle, BuyCoin, ReqLoc or ReqCoin. Variable
status b is used for tracking the status. Variables vid B, eloc B, cid B, eid B
and amount B are used to store intermediate results while generating e-coins or
replying to request from customers or vendors.
This process models three tasks for the broker. The ﬁrst task is the generation
of new e-coins, lines 6 - 15 of Table 2. A customer requests a new e-coin on channel
BuyCoin with parameter cid, the ID of the requesting customer. This event is
guarded by the expression status b == Idle. The event changes the status
to BuyCoin. The broker replies to the customer on channel SellCoin with two
parameters, an e-coin id and the amount of coins. The broker then updates the
two databases (Table 2, lines 26 - 29). The status of the process changes to Idle.
The next task is to pass new e-coins to vendors upon request. The request by
a vendor is modeled by the channel ReqCoin[Bid]. The model uses an array of
channel ReqCoin, one channel for each vendor. The vendor vid is requesting the
broker Bid to send the e-coin eid1 on channel ReqCoin[Bid] with parameters
vid and eid1. It is enabled if the status is Idle. This event will change the status
to ReqCoin and the variables eid B, amount B and vid B will store the e-coin
ID, the amount, and the ID of the requesting vendor respectively. These will be
used by the broker to send the e-coin to the requesting vendor Bvid on channel
SendCoin[Bvid]. This event is enabled, if the status is ReqCoin. The status
will then change to Idle.
The ﬁnal task keeps track of the e-coin location and responds to the location
request by vendors. The channel ReqLoc is used for requests from vendors vid
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Table 2. Broker Process
Broker(BID) =
[STATUS_B == IDLE && (||x:{0..(BROKER_SIZE-1)}@(DB_B[x][0]==-1))]
BuyCoin?cid
5 {
cid_B = cid;
var index = 0;
while(index < BROKER_SIZE)
{
10 if (DB_B[index][0] == eid)
{
eid = (eid+1)%MAXEID;
index = BROKER_SIZE;
}
15 index = index + 1;
}
STATUS_B = BUYCOIN;} -> Broker(BID)
[][STATUS_B == BUYCOIN ]
SellCoin[cid_B]!eid
20 {
var index = 0;
while(index < BROKER_SIZE)
{
if (DB_B[index][0] == -1 && DB_B[index][1] == -1)
25 {
DB_B[index][0] = eid;
DB_B[index][1] = ISPOSITIVE;
LOOKUP[index][0] = eid;
LOOKUP[index][1] = BID;
30 index = BROKER_SIZE;
}
index = index + 1;
}
cid_B = 0;
35 eid = (eid+1)%MAXEID;
STATUS_B = IDLE;} -> Broker(BID)
[][STATUS_B == IDLE]
ReqLoc?vid.eid1
{
40 vid_B = vid;
var index = 0;
while(index < BROKER_SIZE)
{
if (LOOKUP[index][0] == eid1)
45 {
eloc_B = LOOKUP[index][1];
LOOKUP[index][1] = vid;
index = BROKER_SIZE;//break the loop
}
50 index = index + 1;
}
STATUS_B = REQLOC;} -> Broker(BID)
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Table 3. Broker Process (continued)
[][STATUS_B == REQLOC]
SendLoc[vid_B]!eloc_B
{
5 vid_B = 0;
eloc_B = -1;
STATUS_B = IDLE;} -> Broker(BID)
[][STATUS_B == REQCOIN]
SendCoin[vid_B]!eid_B.amount_B
10 { STATUS_B = IDLE;} -> Broker(BID)
[][STATUS_B == IDLE]
ReqCoin[BID]?eid1.vid
{
STATUS_B = REQCOIN;
15 var index = 0;
vid_B = vid;
while (index < BROKER_SIZE)
{
if (DB_B[index][0] == eid1 && DB_B[index][0] != -1)
20 {
eid_B = DB_B[index][0];
amount_B = DB_B[index][1];
index = BROKER_SIZE; //end loop
}
25 index = index + 1;
}
} -> Broker(BID);
for the location of the e-coin eid1. This event is enabled if the status is Idle. The
broker will look up the entry for the e-coin ID eid1 in the Lookup database,
and save it in variable Beloc, and also update the location of the e-coin in the
Lookup database to that of the requesting vendor vid. The state will change
to ReqLoc, which enables the channel SendLoc. This channel is used for the
reply to the vendor request. The status of the process changes to Idle.
3.3 Vendor Process
The process V endor(Vid) shown in Tables 4 and 5 models a vendor with ID Vid.
Each vendor maintains an e-wallet ewallet which contains e-coins of the various
customers. A vendor can have status Idle, Spending, HaveCoin, HaveLoc,
NoCoin, ReqLoc, RecvReq and ReqCoin. The status is stored in variable
status v. Other variables used to store intermediate results are vid V, eloc V,
cid V, amount V and eid V.
The vendor performs two major task: verifying e-coins received from a cus-
tomer and transferring an e-coin to a requesting vendor. The veriﬁcation of the
e-coins has two cases; either the current vendor has the e-coin in its e-wallet,
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Table 4. Vendor Process
Vendor(VID) =
[STATUS_V[VID] == IDLE &&
(||x:{0..(EWALLET_SIZE-1)}@(Ewallet[VID][x][0]==-1))]
5 Spend[VID]?cid.Eid.amount
{
cid_V[VID]=cid;
var index = 0;
var flag = false;
10 while(index < EWALLET_SIZE)
{
if (Ewallet[VID][index][0] == Eid )
{
flag = true;
15 index_V[VID] = index;
index = EWALLET_SIZE;//break the loop
}
index = index + 1;
}
20 if (flag == true)
STATUS_V[VID] = HAVECOIN;
else{
eid_V[VID] = Eid;
STATUS_V[VID] = NOCOIN;
25 }
} ->Vendor(VID)
[][STATUS_V[VID] == HAVECOIN && Ewallet[VID][index_V[VID]][1] == ISPOSITIVE]
Approval[cid_V[VID]]!Ewallet[VID][index_V[VID]][0].ISPOSITIVE
30 {
Ewallet[VID][index_V[VID]][1] = ISPOSITIVE;
index_V[VID] = 0;
cid_V[VID] =-1;
STATUS_V[VID] = IDLE;} ->Vendor(VID)
35 [][STATUS_V[VID] == HAVECOIN && Ewallet[VID][index_V[VID]][1] == ISPOSITIVE]
Approval[cid_V[VID]]!Ewallet[VID][index_V[VID]][0].ISZERO
{
Ewallet[VID][index_V[VID]][1] = ISZERO;
index_V[VID] = 0;
40 cid_V[VID] = -1;
STATUS_V[VID] = IDLE;} ->Vendor(VID)
[][STATUS_V[VID] == HAVECOIN ]
Disapproval[cid_V[VID]]!VID
{STATUS_V[VID] = IDLE;} ->Vendor(VID)
45 [][STATUS_V[VID] == NOCOIN]
ReqLoc!VID.eid_V[VID]
{STATUS_V[VID] = REQLOC;} ->Vendor(VID)
or it is with another vendor or broker. In this case it has to ﬁrst lookup the
location, and then request the e-coin at that location.
The ﬁrst task is initiated by the customer process on channel Spend. The
customer, cid, sends an e-coin ID, Eid, and the amount, amount, to a vendor.
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Table 5. Vendor Process (continued)
[][STATUS_V[VID] == REQLOC]
SendLoc[VID]?loc
{
5 eloc_V[VID] = loc;
STATUS_V[VID] = HAVELOC;
} ->Vendor(VID)
[][STATUS_V[VID] == REQCOIN]
10 SendCoin[VID]?eid1.amt
{
var index = 0;
while(index < EWALLET_SIZE)
{
15 if (Ewallet[VID][index][0] == -1 && Ewallet[VID][index][1] == -1)
{
Ewallet[VID][index][0] = eid1;
Ewallet[VID][index][1] = amt;
index_V[VID] = index;
20 index = EWALLET_SIZE;//break the loop
}
index = index + 1;
}
STATUS_V[VID] = HAVECOIN
25 } ->Vendor(VID)
[][STATUS_V[VID] == RECVREQ]
SendCoin[vid_V[VID]]!eid_V[VID].amount_V[VID]
{
vid_V[VID] = -1;
30 amount_V[VID]=0;
eid_V[VID] = -1;
STATUS_V[VID] = IDLE;} ->Vendor(VID)
[][STATUS_V[VID] == IDLE]
ReqCoin[VID]?eid1.vid
35 {
var index = 0; vid_V[VID] = vid;
while (index < EWALLET_SIZE)
{
if (Ewallet[VID][index][0] == eid1)
40 {
eid_V[VID] = Ewallet[VID][index][0];
amount_V[VID] = Ewallet[VID][index][1];
Ewallet[VID][index][0] = -1;
Ewallet[VID][index][1] = -1;
45 index = EWALLET_SIZE; //end loop
}
index = index + 1;
}
STATUS_V[VID] = RECVREQ;} ->Vendor(VID)
50 [][STATUS_V[VID] == HAVELOC]
ReqCoin[eloc_V[VID]]!eid_V[VID].VID
{
eloc_V[VID]= -1;
eid_V[VID]=-1;
55 STATUS_V[VID] = REQCOIN;} ->Vendor(VID);
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This event is enabled, if the vendor status is Idle. If the vendor has an e-coin
with a matching ID (line 12 of Table 4) it will enter status HaveCoin. If not it
will store the e-coin ID and change the status to NoCoin.
If the vendor does not have the e-coin and the status is NoCoin, it will ﬁrst
request the e-coin location from the broker and then, wait for the broker to reply
with the e-coin location, and then request the e-coin from that vendor or broker.
This three step process is modeled as follows:
– The model uses channel RecLoc for the request of the location. It is enabled
when the process is in the status NoCoin (Table 4, line 45)
– After this request the vendor changes its status toReqLoc. The vendor then
waits for the broker to reply on channel SendLoc with the e-coin location
loc (Table 5, line 5). The vendor then stores the location, V eloc[vid], and
changes the status to HaveLoc.
– The request of the vendor vid from the vendor/broker V eloc[vid] to send e-
coin eid[vid] uses channel ReqCoin. The reply uses the SendCoin channel,
upon which the vendor vid changes the status to HaveCoin.
In status HaveCoin, the vendor approves on channel Approval if the amount
is positive (lines 28 and 35 of Table 4). Otherwise, it will disapprove the transac-
tion on channel Disapproval. If the payment is approved, the vendor saves the
remaining e-coins (line numbers 31 and 37 of Table 4).
The second task for the vendor is to send an e-coin to requesting vendor. A
request for an e-coin eid1, from another vendor, vid, is modeled using channel
ReqCoin. This is a message from vendor vid to vendor VID. The event is enabled
in status Idle. This event stores the details of the e-coins and changes the
status to RecvReq. This enables the reply to the requesting vendor on channel
SendCoin. The status will change to Idle and the e-coin will be removed from
the e-wallet.
The Netpay process is composed of customer, vendor and broker process.
There are three vendors, two customers and one broker in this model as shown
in [4]. The next section will look at the correctness of this protocol to prove
three diﬀerent properties namely chain of trust, preventing double spending and
non-blocking behavior.
4 Correctness of the Netpay Protocol
This section assumes that vendors are cooperative and trusted, which seems
consistent with the fact that in the server-side protocol the customer e-coins are
stored by vendors. Since the touchstone and payword are always stored together
at a trusted party there is no need to prove that the payword remains valid.
In contrast, that was an important property to prove for the client-side Netpay
protocol [3], in which e-coins were stored by the customers, while the broker and
vendors kept the touchstones to verify the e-coins.
For the server-side model we will show three properties. The ﬁrst is that the
e-coin will not be lost by the vendors, which means that the location of the e-coin
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as recorded by the broker will be correct at the end of a transaction. While a
payment is ongoing, it might be temporarily incorrect.
Furthermore, we show that at most one vendor can have a copy of an e-coin.
The length of an e-coin, and thus its amount, is abstracted, and we assume that
subtracting from the amount is dealt correctly by the trusted vendor. The only
remaining way to double spend would be to have two coins. We show that an
e-coin cannot be spent twice at diﬀerent vendors. Finally, we show that there is
a deadlock in the protocol and we will present a solution for this.
4.1 Chain of Trust
E-coins are transferred from broker to vendor and from one vendor to another
vendor, and the customer should be sure that the location of the e-coin will be
tracked in this process. For the server-side Netpay protocol, the following two
properties can be shown to hold:
1. If the customer is in the Idle or BuyCoin state, then the broker will have
the location of the e-coin pointing to the vendor with the e-coin.
2. If the customer is in the Spending state, then the broker will have the
location of the e-coin, or it will point to the vendor which will receive the
e-coin after the next exchange of e-coins.
The following lists the goals deﬁned in the PAT model checker:
– Property 1 shows for each e-coin ID held by a customer, that there exists a
corresponding e-coin in the broker database.
– Property 2 shows for each e-coin ID in the lookup database, that there exists
a corresponding e-coin in the broker database, if the location lookup[y][1] is
the broker ID.
– Property 3 shows for each e-coin ID held by the customer, that if the loca-
tion of the e-coin is not the broker ID and the customer status is Idle or
BuyCoin, then there exists a corresponding e-coin at that location.
– Property 4 shows for each e-coin ID held by the customer, that if the loca-
tion of the e-coin is not equal to the broker ID and the customer status is
Spending, then there exists a corresponding e-coin at that location or at
a location stored in variable eloc V. This means that while the broker may
have information that is temporarily not valid, the correct location is stored
in an auxiliary variable.
The properties 1 - 4 were veriﬁed using the PAT model checker.
4.2 Double Spending
The main goal of this property is to prevent customers from spending an e-
coin more than once. Note, that because we abstract the exact amount of an
e-coin it can be spent as long as the amount is IsPositive. This assumes that
the vendor updates the amount correctly. However, double spending could still
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Property 1. Chain of Trust - Comparison of customer and broker databases
#define Chain_of_Trust_1(&&y:{0..(MAXCOINS-1)};x:{0..(CUSTOMERS-1)}
@(DB_C[x][y][0]==-1 ||(||z:{0..(BROKER_SIZE-1)}
@(DB_C[x][y][0] == DB_B[z][0]))));
#assert Netpay |=[] Chain_of_Trust_1 ;
Property 2. Chain of Trust - Comparison of broker and lookup databases
#define Chain_of_Trust_2(&&y:{0..BROKER_SIZE-1}@(LOOKUP[y][1]!= BROKERID
||(||z:{0..BROKER_SIZE-1}@(DB_B[z][0] == LOOKUP[y][0]))));
#assert Netpay |=[] Chain_of_Trust_2 ;
Property 3. Chain of Trust - Comparison of vendor, customer and lookup
databases
#define Chain_of_Trust_3(&&y:{0..(MAXCOINS-1)};a:{0..(CUSTOMERS-1)}
@(||z:{0..(BROKER_SIZE-1)}@(!(DB_C[a][y][0] == LOOKUP[z][0]
&& LOOKUP[z][1]!= BROKERID &&(STATUS_C[a] == IDLE ||
STATUS_C[a] == BUYCOIN))) || (||x:{0..(VENDORS-1)}
@(||b:{0..(EWALLET_SIZE-1)}@(DB_C[a][y][0]==Ewallet[x][b][0])))));
#assert Netpay |=[] Chain_of_Trust_3;
Property 4. Chain of Trust - Comparison of customer, lookup and diﬀerent
vendor databases
#define Chain_of_Trust_4(&&y:{0..(MAXCOINS-1)};a:{0..(CUSTOMERS-1)}
@(||z:{0..(BROKER_SIZE-1)}@(DB_C[a][y][0] != LOOKUP[z][0]
|| STATUS_C[a] != SPENDING || (&&x:{0..(VENDORS-1)}
@(LOOKUP[z][1]!= x || eloc_V[x]==-1 || eloc_V[x]==BROKERID)
||(||b:{0..(EWALLET_SIZE-1)}@(DB_C[a][y][0] == Ewallet[eloc_V[x]][b][0]
|| DB_C[a][y][0] == Ewallet[x][b][0]))))) ) ;
#assert Netpay |=[] Chain_of_Trust_4;
occur, if there would be e-wallets with same e-coin ID and a positive amount.
In that case the customer could spend the same e-coin at two diﬀerent vendors.
We prove that all e-coins exists only once in one e-wallet at any time. This is
expressed in Property 5: No two e-wallets have the same e-coin ID whose amount
is IsPositive. This means that the coin cannot be spent twice. A Windows 7,
i5 processor, 3.2 GHz and 6 GB RAM machine took about eleven minutes to
verify all 5 properties.
4.3 Non-Blocking Behavior
The CSP model described in Section 3 uses channels for communication between
diﬀerent processes. A sender process will be blocked on an output channel if no
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Property 5. Double Spending
#define DoubleSpending(&&x:{0..VENDORS-1};a:{0..VENDORS-1}
@(&&y:{0..EWALLET_SIZE-1};z:{0..EWALLET_SIZE-1}
@((Ewallet[x][y][0]==-1||Ewallet[a][z][0]==-1
||Ewallet[x][y][1]==ISZERO||Ewallet[a][z][1]==ISZERO || a==x)
||(Ewallet[x][y][0]!=Ewallet[a][z][0]))));
#assert Netpay |=[] DoubleSpending;
Fig. 1. Deadlock in Netpay protocol
other process has a matching input channel that is enabled. If a channel is
blocked indeﬁnitely, then there is a deadlock in the protocol. We use PAT to
check for absence of deadlocks.
PAT did identify a deadlock in the protocol. Figure 1 depicts the trace that
was generated by PAT model checker. The deadlock occurs as follows: Cus-
tomer(0) buys an e-coin with Broker(3) and spends e-coins at vendor(0). Ven-
dor(0) requests the e-coin location from the broker. The broker provides its own
ID as e-coin location and updates the location for this e-coin to 0. Vendor(0)
requests and receives the e-coin from the broker. Vendor(0) approves payment
for Customer(0), but the amount remains positive. Likewise, Customer(1) buys
an e-coin and spends it at Vendor(1), with a positive amount remaining. Now
Customer(0) spends e-coins with ID 0 at vendor(1) while Customer(1) spends e-
coins with ID 1 at Vendor(0). Vendor(1) requests and receives e-coin location as
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0 from broker. Vendor(1) requests for e-coin location and receives 1 from broker.
Now they ask request the e-coin from each other, and enter a circular wait.
This model of the protocol has been corrected by adding a separate process for
the vendor side to handle reply for e-coins request. This process can be found in
[4]. With these changes PAT can verify deadlock freedom. The description of the
protocol does not specify how many processes a vendor should have [7], although
it is presented as if it were a single process. A prototype implementation also
used a single process. Our results suggest that the vendor should be split instead
into two parts to avoid a deadlock.
4.4 Non-Cooperative Customers and Vendors
A system is not only composed of cooperative parties but there will be some
parties who will try to cheat the protocol. In such a case, the protocol may not
be correct anymore. The current protocol does deal with customers who try to
spend e-coins that have zero amount, and also with customers who want to spend
the same e-coin twice. However, if we would enable a customer to send e-coin
IDs that do not exists in the broker or vendor databases, it will cause currently
a deadlock. The current protocol provides no way for a broker to communicate
back to vendor that an e-coin does not exist. This problem is, however, easily
addressed by adding one more case for a declined payment.
We also considered cheating vendors in models that do not abstract from the
exact amount an e-coin is worth. Since vendors in the Server-side Netpay protocol
handle the e-wallet they can cheat by deducting or redeeming the wrong amount.
It will be very diﬃcult for the customer (or broker) to detect such behavior. In
the client-side protocol the customer owned the payword, and could use this to
verify correct behavior of the vendor.
5 Conclusions and Future Research
This paper modeled the server-side Netpay protocol used for micro-payment us-
ing CSP, and veriﬁed three important properties using the PAT model checker.
The ﬁrst is that the broker keeps track of e-coins throughout, even if it is trans-
ferred from vendor to vendor. The second is that a customer cannot spend more
than an e-coin is worth. The protocol prevents double spending. The last is that
the protocol has deadlock when two vendors request e-coins from each other.
This has been rectiﬁed by adding a separate process to deal with transfer of
e-coins from one to another.
The veriﬁcation was done based under the assumption that the broker, ven-
dors, and customers adhere to the protocol. There have been few restrictions
on the behavior of the customer though, who is able use the same e-coin again
and again. Future research involves working on proving validity of e-coins and
double spending when the customer and vendors are not cooperative, and when
the vendors cannot be fully trusted.
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